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The Signaling Role of Fiscal Austerity
Anna Gibert†
15 July 2016
Abstract
I build a model where creditworthy countries may use fiscal austerity to communi-
cate their ability to repay sovereign debt and show that the signaling channel is active
only for high levels of asymmetric information. The model generates a negative associ-
ation between the amount of public information, provided by the rating agencies, and
fiscal tightness. Informed by the model predictions, I perform an empirical investiga-
tion based on a panel of 58 OECD and emerging market economies since 1980 and find
evidence of this signaling channel.
JEL Classification: D82; E62; F34; G24.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the role of fiscal austerity as a way to communicate a sovereign’s
ability to honor the debt. Austerity is at the forefront of the public policy debate following
the European sovereign debt crisis. It refers to a combination of measures that reduce a
country’s deficit, hence, the debt burden. Most of the discussion about austerity measures
revolved around the issue of debt sustainability (ECB, 2012; StLouisFED, 2012).However,
a number of countries engaging in sizable austerity after 2010 were thought to be in the
safe European “core.” For instance, Germany announced plans to reduce its budget deficit
by 80 billion euros by 2014. The UK embarked on the biggest cuts in state spending since
World War II, while the Netherlands also went through several austerity packages despite a
relatively low ratio of debt to GDP.1 The argument advocated by policymakers is that such
measures reassured the markets about the country’s creditworthiness and helped maintain
access to international lending. In the words of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “austerity
measures are adopted in order to send a very important signal,”2 or, as the British Chancellor
of the Exchequer George Osborne put it, “we have to convince the world that we can pay
our way in the world.”3
In the first part of this paper I build a model of sovereign debt that incorporates a
signaling role for fiscal austerity. Countries di↵er in their ability to repay their sovereign
debt. The key feature is that the ability to pay is unobservable; hence, it means that lenders
cannot di↵erentiate between di↵erent types of countries. For example, one could think of
these types as reflecting the varied political preferences of citizens with respect to the trade-
o↵ between public spending and debt repayment. Some countries are more resistant than
others at accepting tax increases or expenditure reductions. Although attempts to cut public
wages and reform the pension system were met with social protest in Portugal and had to
be abandoned,4 similar measures were successfully implemented in other countries, including
Italy and Spain. An alternative way to view these types is related to a country’s degree of
tax evasion. Sovereigns might not be equally e cient at levying taxes or fighting tax evasion,
so their ability to repay debt is limited accordingly.
The economic mechanism is similar to Spence’s signaling model of education (Spence,
1973), in which a more able individual has a lower cost of completing an action (getting
education) and uses this choice to convey information about his/her ability. However, unlike
with Spence’s signal, the choice of debt in my model also has a direct e↵ect on the ability
1“EU austerity drive country by country,” BBC News, 21 May 2012.
2“Merkelettes’ Siren Song Sounds Very German,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 July 2011.
3“Sterling hits two-year low after Moody’s UK downgrade,” The Telegraph Investor, 25 February 2013.
4“Portugal court rules public sector pay cut unconstitutional,” BBC News, 6 July 2012.
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to repay. I derive the conditions that imply the single-crossing property, which enables
me to find a separating equilibrium. The separating equilibrium outcome is the following:
more creditworthy countries choose to issue less debt than the optimum level under full
information. A su cient amount of austerity makes less able countries unwilling to imitate
this strategy; hence, the market rewards austerity with a lower risk premium on sovereign
debt. The model admits other equilibria as well. Selection is made using the undefeated
equilibrium refinement by Mailath et al. (1993). This concept is particularly useful for
analyzing the welfare properties of equilibria (Sobel, 2009). In my model, the refinement
delivers a sharp empirical prediction: the nature of the equilibrium that prevails - separating
or pooling- is uniquely determined by the amount of information about the country type.
I show how the amount of information changes with the introduction of sovereign ratings
and conclude that less informative ratings are linked to increases in austerity for signaling
purposes.
In the empirical section, I perform an analysis of a panel of 58 countries since the 1980s
to find evidence of the signaling channel. The focus is on two indicators of the amount
of public information about a country creditworthiness: (1) the cross-sectional correlation
between sovereign yields and sovereign ratings over time; and (2) a dummy for extreme
sovereign yield changes conditional on the rating category. Using time and rating-varying
indicators of informativeness, I exploit the panel dimension of the data to determine changes
in austerity. I also use the fact that the overall informativeness of the ratings is not likely
to be a↵ected by an individual country’s choice of fiscal policy. Five variables measure
fiscal austerity: (1) the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB); (2) the government
net borrowing; (3) the net primary balance; (4) public spending; and (5) a dummy variable
for fiscal consolidations that is based on the narrative approach of Devries et al. (2011). I
find that the correlation between sovereign yields and ratings is negatively associated with
all the measures of fiscal austerity. The coe cient remains significantly di↵erent than zero
after controlling for other variables that are usually used in the literature estimating fiscal
rules (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013). Further
robustness checks evaluate alternative hypotheses and favor the signaling channel as the
most compelling explanation of the evidence.
Literature review. A few other works consider incomplete information in a model of
sovereign debt (Sandleris, 2008; Drudi and Prati, 2000; Fostel et al., 2013). Although some
of them explore signaling, none of the above is primarily concerned with the role of aus-
terity as a signal. The closest article to mine is Dellas and Niepelt (2014), who provide a
formal definition of austerity in the context of incomplete information as “the shortfall of
consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment capacity.”
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In my set-up, this “consumption gap” maps into a “debt gap.” Dellas and Niepelt (2014)
consider several instruments a country might use to signal its creditworthiness, especially
public investment, and argue that, in some cases, signaling might be associated with aus-
terity. Instead, I shift the attention to austerity as the instrument for signaling and then
incorporate the sovereign ratings into the model, which allow me to perform an empirical
analysis based on the predictions of the model.
The empirical exercise in this paper is related to a large body of literature that docu-
ments the changes in the informativeness of the credit ratings over time (Partnoy, 2006; Ki↵
et al., 2012; Bussiere and Ristiniemi, 2012; De Santis, 2012). I abstract from the various
explanations advanced to motivate the shifts in informativeness5 and link the changes in my
two indicators of informativeness to the changes in austerity made by a given country. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of the signaling channel in fiscal
policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the model and in Section 3
I characterize the equilibrium set. Sovereign credit ratings are introduced in Section 4.1,
while Section 4.2 extends the model to multiple periods. Section 5 is devoted to the empirical
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a two-period small open economy where a sovereign borrower issues debt to foreign
lenders in order to maximize its citizens welfare.6 The sovereign country has limited com-
mitment, defaulting whenever it is unable to fully repay its debt. Depending on its ability
to repay, the sovereign can be of two types, indexed by i 2 {A,B} with probability p and
1  p respectively. Foreign lenders do not know what type of borrower the country is.
Lenders’ problem. Lenders are risk-neutral. They lend the amount qD2 in period 1 to the
sovereign, where q is the price of debt in period 1. If there is no default, they receive D2 in
period 2. In case of default, there is no partial repayment. The lender profit function is:
⇧ =  qD2 +  0D2[1   (D2, µ)], (2.1)
5A non-exhaustive list of contributions include Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013); Holden et al. (2012); Manso
(2013); Mathis et al. (2009); White (2010); Skreta and Veldkamp (2009); Josepson and Shapiro (2014); Opp
et al. (2013) and Cole and Cooley (2014).
6In the model, sovereign debt is equivalent to external debt. Domestic debt does not play any role in
this model because the government has enough instruments to allocate consumption intertemporally for its
citizens.
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where  0 is the lenders’ discount factor, µ the probability that the borrower is of type A and
 (D,µ) = [µ (D, 1) + (1  µ) (D, 0)] represents the expected sovereign’s default probability
at (D,µ) and will be precisely defined below. Lenders compete a` la Bertrand over lending
conditions driving profits to zero. As a result, the equilibrium price function satisfies:
q(D2, µ) =  
0[1   (D2, µ)]. (2.2)
The sovereign debt price responds to the amount of debt issued and the lenders’ belief about
creditworthiness. The higher the price is, the more advantageous are the borrowing terms
for the sovereign.
Sovereign’s problem. The problem solved by the sovereign government is to maximise
citizens’ expected discounted utility c1 +  E[c2], where   is the discount factor. The repre-
sentative citizen has endowment !1 in period 1, and a random endowment !2 in period 2,
which is drawn from an exponential distribution f(!2) with support [!,1), hazard rate h
and cumulative function F (!2).7 Given the initial level of debt D1, the sovereign government
chooses the debt level D2 and taxes T1, T2 to satisfy the government budget.
Each country, of type i = A,B, that repays its debt satisfies the following constraints:
ct  !t   Tt, for t = 1, 2; (2.3)
T1   D1   q(D2, µ)D2 and T2   D2. (2.4)
ct   ci for t = 1, 2. (2.5)
Constraint (2.3) is the budget constraint of the respective citizens. Constraints (2.4) repre-
sent the government budget constraint in t = 1, 2. The initial level of debt D1 is exogenous
and D3 = 0 since in the last period debt cannot be rolled over. It is easy to see that
both (2.3) and (2.4) will be satisfied with equality. Hence, once the choice of D2 is taken,
taxes and consumption in t = 1 are fully pinned down under repayment. Constraint (2.5)
introduces heterogeneity in the ability to pay across countries. It states that the sovereign
government must guarantee to its citizens a consumption level of ci every period. Di↵erences
in the guaranteed level of consumption are the only source of ex-ante heterogeneity across
countries.
I assume
cA < cB. (A1)
Constraint (2.5), together with the budget constraint (2.3), imposes a cap on the ability
7The exponential function f(!) = he h! features a constant hazard rate, which is helpful in order to
obtain the same level of equilibrium debt for both types under full information.
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to tax. Since cB is higher than cA, country B is less able to repay the outstanding debt than
country A for the same level of income. Stated di↵erently, ceteris paribus, country B is less
creditworthy.
In order to always guarantee the existence of a feasible allocation I also assume the
following
!   cB. (A2)
I assume away strategic default. Since !2 2 [!,1), in the first period, a country will
never default. Default will occur in period 2 for !2  D2+ci. If the second period endowment
realization does not su ce to cover both the commitments versus foreign lenders and the
domestic commitments on citizens’ required consumption, the country defaults on its debt.
Otherwise the country complies with its commitment. The probability of default for country
i = A,B, with debt level D2 is hence F (D2 + ci).
Our analysis will be confined to the range of parameters that satisfy
cB >
!1  D1 +  0!
1 +  0
. (A3)
This condition rules out the uninteresting case in which the two types have zero probability
of default.8 By assumption (A1), F (D2+cA)  F (D2+cB) 8D2 and, by (A3), the inequality
is strict. For any given debt level, a type A country is less prone to default. This predispo-
sition to default is driven by unobservable fundamentals of the country - ci - but the type
that actually defaults depends on the equilibrium choices and, ultimately, the endowment
realization.
In case of default, the citizens consumption is assumed to be ci and the lenders do not
receive any repayment. The di↵erence between the endowment realization and consumption
after default, !2   ci, is a deadweight loss. Finally, I assume
 0 >   · 1  F (D2 + c
A)
1  F (D2 + cB) =   · e
h(cB cA). (A4)
Thanks to the exponential assumption, we can state this condition as a function of exogenous
parameters. Since eh(c
B cA) > 1, it implies that the discount factor abroad  0 is higher than
the domestic discount factor   by a wedge that is high enough to compensate for the di↵erence
in risk premia across types. External lenders are willing to finance a type B sovereign at a
rate that is attractive domestically for both types. This makes a sovereign country willing
8The maximum level of debt that allows country B to be risk free in the second period is D2 = !   cB .
Assume that this level (or a lower one) would be unfeasible in the first period at the risk-free price  0:
cB > !1  D1 +  0(!   cB), or reformulated, cB   !1 D1+ 
0!
1+ 0 . Assumptions (A3) and (A2) are compatible
as long as !   !1  D1.
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to increase period 1 consumption and finance it by issuing new debt.9 What remains to
be determined is how much new debt the country wants to issue, once it internalizes that
issuing debt changes the relative price of debt versus repayment. And this choice can be
made contingent on the type.
Single crossing. Combining the previous ingredients, the discounted expected utility of
sovereign i is:
U i(q,D2) := !1  D1 + qD2 (2.6)
+  
⇥
F (D2 + c
i)ci +
 
1  F (D2 + ci)
   
E[!2|!2   D2 + ci] D2
 ⇤
.
The first line of the right-hand side represents the citizens’ consumption in the first period:
the endowment !1 plus the net borrowing of the period. The second line represents the
expectation of consumption in period 2 discounted by  : with probability F (D2 + ci), the
country defaults and consumption is ci, and with the complementary probability, consump-
tion is the result of the endowment, noticing that !2 can only be a realization compatible
with repayment, minus the debt outstanding. Expression (2.6) can be used to define the
indi↵erence curves in the space of two key variables (D2, q). Those indi↵erence curves are
represented in figure 1 for the two types of countries.
Figure 1: Single crossing property of the preferences.
As explained below, for all D2, the slope of type B’s indi↵erence curves in (D2, q) is
9I choose to motivate the willingness to issue debt by making international credit relatively cheap do-
mestically. Other authors achieve the same result with di↵erent assumptions: for example, assuming the
government has to finance an investment project that pays in the future (Sandleris, 2008) or that o ce-
motivated politicians like debt (Acharya and Rajan, 2011).
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steeper than that of type A. A decrease from D2 to D02, as depicted in figure 1, needs to
be compensated with an increase from q to q0A for type A and from q to q
0
B for type B.
This implies that any two curves of A and B can cross at most once in the space (D2, q).
The reason behind it is that default occurs when a country cannot a↵ord repayment and, as
this depends only on solvency, B can do it more often.10 Hence, a type B country benefits
more from debt because it anticipates that it has to pay back less. A formal proof of the
single-crossing property can be found in Appendix A.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Full information
As a benchmark, let us describe the equilibrium of the model when the type of the country
is observable. The full information equilibrium allocation is a price and a debt level for each
type. In this case, the lenders know type i’s probability of default for each level of debt and
charge the actuarially fair price qi(D2) =  0 [1  F (D2 + ci)]. The sovereign faces the price
schedule qi(D2) and maximises the discounted expected utility (equation (2.6)):
max
D2
!1  D1 + qiD2 +  
⇥
F (D2 + c
i)ci +
 
1  F (D2 + ci)
  ⇥
E(!2|!2   D2 + ci) D2
⇤⇤
(3.1)
subject to qi(D2) =  
0 ⇥1  F (D2 + ci)⇤ .
The first order condition (FOC) with respect to D2 is the following:
@qi(D2)
@D2
D2 + q
i(D2)   
 
1  F (D2 + ci)
 
= 0. (3.2)
The first term in (3.2) represents the change in cost that every inframarginal unit of debt
experiences when an additional unit is issued. The second term is the gain from bringing
consumption to the present at the current price qi(D2). Finally, the third term represents
the cost of the repayment promise: each unit of debt will be repaid in the next period only
if there is no default, which happens with probability 1  F (D2 + ci).
Substituting the price schedule qi(D2) in the FOC, after some transformations, we ob-
10Note that the penalty for default is higher for type A, cA !2 D2 < cB  !2 D2 8D2. However, the
single crossing property does not require heterogeneous penalty across types. The penalty could be made
equal, provided it is not high enough to prevent any default, and type B would still default in more states
than A because default is not strategic.
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tain:11
Di2 =
 0    
 0

F 0(Di2 + c
i)
1  F (Di2 + ci)
  1
. (3.3)
And, recalling that h is the hazard rate of the endowment exponential distribution f(·),
equation (3.3) simplifies to:
DA2 = D
B
2 =
 0    
 0h
. (3.4)
The expression (3.4) is the optimal level of debt under full information. Call the full
information equilibrium debt level DFI2 . D
FI
2 is positive because of assumption (A4). It
means that the country issues a positive amount of debt in order to take advantage of
the favourable lending conditions. Despite DFI2 is the same for both types, in equilibrium,
di↵erent types face a di↵erent price. Price is lower for type B because this type defaults
more than the other, so its debt carries a higher risk premium:
qB(DFI2 ) =  
0 ⇥1  F  DFI2 + cB ⇤
<  0
⇥
1  F  DFI2 + cA ⇤ = qA(DFI2 ).
3.2 Incomplete information
Consider a game where the type of sovereign is unobservable. Nature draws a type A with
probability p. A sovereign knows its type and chooses how much debt to issue, balancing
the benefits of increasing present consumption and the probability of future default. The
sovereign also takes into account that its choice of debt may reveal information about its
type to the uninformed lenders and, therefore, influence their pricing decisions.
The country’s strategy is a choice of debt D⇤2. The lenders’ strategy is a price function
that depends on the observedD⇤2 as well as the lenders’ beliefs about the type of the sovereign.
The adopted solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies.
Definition 3.1. A symmetric PBE in pure strategies is a set of strategies for the sovereign
and the lenders,
D⇤2 : {A,B}! R
q⇤ : R⇥ [0, 1]! R+
11See Appendix B for the proof.
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and a system of beliefs µ⇤ : R! [0, 1] on the country being of type A, such that:
• For i = A,B, D⇤2(i) maximises expected utility U i given the lenders’ strategy q⇤(·).
• q⇤(·) is consistent with zero expected profits: q⇤(D2, µ⇤) =  0[1   (D2, µ⇤)] 8D2, µ.
• The system of beliefs µ⇤(D2) is consistent with Bayes’ rule and the equilibrium strategies
whenever possible. That gives the following equilibrium beliefs function.
– Let {·} be the indicator function taking the value 1 if the condition in curly
brackets holds and zero otherwise.
– If p {D⇤2(A)=D2} + (1  p) {D⇤2(B)=D2} 6= 0 then:
µ⇤(D2) =
p {D⇤2(A)=D2}
p {D⇤2(A)=D2} + (1  p) {D⇤2(B)=D2}
,
– If p {D⇤2(A)=D2} + (1  p) {D⇤2(B)=D2} = 0, then µ⇤ 2 [0, 1].
Separating equilibria. An equilibrium is separating when a sovereign chooses a di↵erent
debt level depending on its type. Let the equilibrium outcome be the vector of debt levels
and prices denoted by {D⇤2(i), q⇤(i)}i2{A,B}.
A type A country obtains debt at better market conditions because it is less prone to
default. Hence, a type B sovereign might have an incentive to pretend to be of type A
in order to improve its borrowing terms. To this end, it might choose to mimic type A’s
strategy. Hence, the relevant incentive compatibility constraint is type B’s,
UB (D⇤2(B), q
⇤(B))   UB (D⇤2(A), q⇤(A)) . (3.5)
Proposition 3.1. There exists a separating equilibrium outcome
(D⇤2(A), q
⇤(A)) , (D⇤2(B), q
⇤(B)), where D⇤(B) = DFI2 , q
⇤(B) =  0
⇥
1  F (D⇤2(B) + cB)
⇤
,
D⇤(A) = D B2 is the level that satisfies (3.5) with equality and q
⇤(A) =
 0
⇥
1  F (D⇤2(A) + cA)
⇤
. This is supported by the equilibrium beliefs µ⇤(D⇤2(A)) = 1
and µ⇤(D2) = 0 for D2 6= D⇤2(A).
Proof. Appendix C.
The allocation (D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)), represented in figure 2, is preferred by A to any other
allocation under the price represented by the dotted bold line. At the same time, B is
indi↵erent between that allocation and (DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)) by definition.
12 The intuition is
12Its incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) is satisfied with equality.
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Figure 2: Separating equilibrium e⇤.
that A’s isoutility curves in the space (D2, q) are flatter than B’s. Type A is willing to
accept a larger debt reduction for a given change in the price of debt. It, therefore, finds
attractive allocations that are not attractive to B.
Type A chooses (D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)) while B chooses its full information allocation D
FI
2 .
No type has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. But choosing a di↵erent allocation than
DFI2 is costly for A as well. The larger the deviation, the higher the cost for A. Since D
 B
2
is the threshold debt level that allows separation of the types, the equilibrium e⇤ described
in proposition 3.1 is the least cost separating equilibrium.
In a separating equilibrium, type A’s equilibrium choice of debt is lower than that of the
full information solution (D B2  DFI2 < 0). We say that the country is using austerity for
signaling purposes. The choice of a lower level of debt improves the debt price schedule,
lowering the risk premium associated to each D2. Summing up, reducing the amount of debt
to the D B2 level has a double e↵ect: it directly improves the risk premium, because it lowers
the default probability, and it indirectly a↵ects the perception of the type, which improves
the risk premium further. If it were not for the indirect e↵ect, though, type A would not
choose to go through with austerity.13 Hence, signaling is the key for fiscal policy to tilt
toward austerity.
Pooling equilibria. A pooling equilibrium arises if type A does not find it advantageous to
reduce the amount of debt in order to obtain the benefits from revealing its type. It consists
of an equilibrium debt level D⇤2 and a price of debt q
⇤(D⇤2, p), equal for both types. As a
result, the lenders cannot distinguish the types from observing their debt choices and their
13The direct e↵ect is present at the full information problem as well and type A chooses to issue more
debt in equilibrium.
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best guess is the prior p. For example:
Proposition 3.2. A pooling equilibrium at the full information allocation is supported by
the belief system µ⇤(DFI2 ) = p and µ
⇤(D2) = 0 for D2 6= DFI2 . The price of debt in a pooling
equilibrium equals
q⇤(DFI2 , p) =  
0  p ⇥1  F (DFI2 + cA)⇤+ (1  p) ⇥1  F (DFI2 + cB)⇤  . (3.6)
Proof. Appendix D.
See figure 3, where the price schedule is again represented by the dotted bold line. The
o↵-equilibrium threat that a country will be penalised in its risk premium if it deviates
from DFI2 might allow a pooling equilibrium to be sustained at the candidate D
FI
2 . Any
type of sovereign prefers to choose DFI2 and be o↵ered the pooling price under these beliefs.
Beliefs are admissible because in equilibrium the pooling price satisfies Bayes’ rule and o↵-
equilibrium they are free to be any µ 2 [0, 1].14
Figure 3: A pooling equilibrium at DFI2 .
3.3 Refinements
A signaling game, like the one presented here, typically admits a multiplicity of equilibria.
This is because a large set of o↵-equilibrium beliefs is consistent with the equilibrium def-
14They are set to µ = 0 in this case.
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inition, making it easier to sustain a given equilibrium. In my model, proposition 3.1 and
proposition 3.2 are examples of di↵erent equilibria that may coexist. To reduce the set of
equilibria, I use a refinement of the PBE introduced by Mailath et al. (1993): the undefeated
equilibrium (UE).
The UE refinement restricts the set of admissible o↵-equilibrium beliefs. Beliefs about
a deviation to a di↵erent allocation are admissible if the probability distribution over types
is consistent with such types choosing that allocation in another equilibrium and being
weakly better o↵ by doing so. Otherwise, o↵-equilibrium beliefs are inconsistent. If this o↵-
equilibrium consistency requirement restricts beliefs in such a way that they do not sustain
a given equilibrium, this equilibrium is defeated and we say that it does not survive the
refinement.15 An equilibrium is defined to be undefeated if it is not defeated by any other.
Unlike dominance-based refinements,16 the UE refinement focuses on the e ciency prop-
erties of the equilibrium. The consistency of an o↵-equilibrium strategy is evaluated on the
basis of which type(s) is weakly better o↵ in an alternative equilibrium where this strat-
egy is chosen. In any pooling equilibrium, a sovereign chooses a given D2 irrespective of
its type. For this equilibrium to be undefeated any type must be better o↵ choosing that
allocation compared to deviating to di↵erent equilibrium strategy. Thus, the UE privileges
the equilibria that are e cient in a Pareto sense.
Proposition 3.3. Applying the UE refinement to the game, equilibria of the separating
and the pooling class cannot coexist. For a su ciently small p there is a unique separating
equilibrium where type A chooses D B2 , otherwise there are pooling equilibria with D2 > D
 B
2 .
As stated in the proposition, for p < p¯, the unique equilibrium of the problem is e⇤,
where p¯ is the threshold level of the prior that makes type A indi↵erent between the signaling
allocation
 
D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)
 
and pooling with type B at (D⇤2, q(D
⇤
2, p¯)). The line of proof
goes as follows: first, notice that the least costly separating equilibrium e⇤ defeats any other
separating equilibrium. All separating equilibria reveal the type of the sovereign but e⇤ does
it with the smallest deviation from the full information allocation for type A. Hence, type A
is strictly better o↵ at e⇤. This means that o↵-equilibrium beliefs at D B2 must be µ = 1 for
any other separating equilibrium but those beliefs do not sustain an equilibrium atD2 6= D B2
because such an equilibrium would be defeated by e⇤. Furthermore, e⇤ defeats any pooling
equilibrium if type A is better o↵ signaling (that is, for p < p¯). When choosing D B2 gives
type A a higher utility, this cannot be ignored o↵ equilibrium in any pooling equilibrium
and thus it is inconsistent if A does not realize it would be better o↵ deviating to D B2 . The
15See appendix E for a formal definition of the UE refinement.
16Notably the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987) and divinity by Banks and Sobel (1987).
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pooling equilibrium is, therefore, defeated. In this case, e⇤ is the unique equilibrium of the
model. A formal proof is presented in appendix F.
If p   p¯ then both types are better o↵ pooling, thus e⇤ is defeated by a pooling equilib-
rium. The proof is presented in appendix G. The UE refinement allows pooling equilibria
to survive.17 Pooling e0 survives if there is no other pooling equilibrium in which both types
are better o↵. Hence, undefeated pooling can be sustained at any allocation in the range
[D⇤A2 , D
⇤B
2 ], where D
⇤A
2 is the allocation preferred by type A under schedule q(·, p) and D⇤B2 is
the one preferred by type B. Pooling equilibria in allocations outside that range are defeated
by other pooling equilibria within that range because they are strictly preferred by both
types. Within this range moving closer to one type’s preferred allocation means moving
further from the other; hence, types cannot both be made better o↵.
Restating the result of proposition 3.3, a separating equilibrium will exist depending on
the beliefs about the creditworthiness of a country. A small p reflects a prior that the country
is most likely of type B, thus providing large incentives for a type A to signal and separate
itself from the uninformed pool. As p becomes larger, ex-ante beliefs of the lenders about
creditworthiness are more optimistic, and both types are satisfied foregoing austerity because
the potential price benefits of signaling would not be large. Once both types prefer to pool,
the least preferred separating equilibrium is defeated and only pooling equilibria exist.
4 Public information and multiple-periods
4.1 Credit rating
In the model, signaling depends on the belief distribution over types: if lenders believe
the sovereign’s creditworthiness is most likely high, a country does not gain much from
17Note that with the ‘intuitive criterion’ (Cho and Kreps, 1987), the separating equilibrium always elim-
inates all pooling equilibria and it remains the unique equilibrium in this kind of signaling game with two
players and single crossing preferences. According to it, if a deviation from a candidate equilibrium is dom-
inated for one type but not for another, this deviation should not be attributed to the type for which the
deviation is dominated. Hence, no pooling equilibrium can dominate the separating equilibrium e⇤ because
the single crossing property creates a space between the indi↵erence curves such that any D2 to the left of the
pooling allocation would be preferred only for type A and not for B. At every such D2 beliefs must be such
that µ = 1 and those o↵-equilibrium beliefs cannot sustain a candidate pooling equilibrium. The intuitive
criterion fixes an equilibrium (e.g. e0) and then restricts the o↵-equilibrium beliefs that are inconsistent with
the dominated choices for each agent based on that equilibrium e0. Similarly, the UE fixes an equilibrium e0
but the o↵-equilibrium beliefs at D2 are restricted looking at another equilibrium where this allocation D2
is an equilibrium allocation. Restrictions are established based on consistency with the type(s) that would
choose D2 in the new equilibrium, only if the type(s) are better o↵ than at the fixed equilibrium e0. So the
allocations that dominate the pooling allocation in the intuitive criterion do not exist in the UE because
they are not equilibrium strategies of an alternative equilibrium. As a consequence, pooling can survive.
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implementing costly austerity to improve the market’s perception. Thus, it is useful to
explore how changes in the lender’s views on creditworthiness a↵ect austerity.
A Credit Rating Agency (CRA) issues sovereign ratings: they are opinions on the credit
standing of a country. Credit ratings a↵ect how the public perceives the creditworthiness
of the country. I model a sovereign rating as a public signal: r 2 {r¯, r}. The rating is im-
perfectly informative about the country’s creditworthiness and the degree of informativeness
is captured by a parameter ⇢. ⇢ 2 [0, 1] is the probability that the CRA detects a type B
country and assigns a low rating r: Prob (r | B). Country B receives a low rating r with
probability ⇢ and, with probability 1   ⇢, it receives a high rating r¯. A type A country
always receives a high rating.
Once ratings are assigned, the debt market is segmented into di↵erent markets conditional
on the rating. A low rating perfectly reveals a B type and the country rated r is removed from
the complementary market r¯. Hence, the rating ameliorates the asymmetry of information
but does not eliminate it completely. The residual asymmetry of information depends on
⇢.18 The empirical literature on credit ratings finds robust evidence that the ratings add
information on average, measuring the impact that either ratings or new announcements have
on the market (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Lee et al., 2010; Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007). In
addition, some papers note that this impact changes over time (Ki↵ et al., 2012; De Santis,
2012) and that the explanatory power of the ratings diminishes in times of crisis (Bussiere
and Ristiniemi, 2012).
I concentrate my analysis on the r¯ category for the remainder of this paper.19 Recall from
proposition (3.3) that the existence of an equilibrium with ‘signaling austerity’ depends on
the proportion of types p. The parameter ⇢, by modifying the proportion of types in each
segmented market, a↵ects the determination of the equilibrium. The posterior pˆ(⇢) is:
pˆ(⇢, r) =
8<: p1 ⇢(1 p) if r = r¯0 if r = r. (4.1)
If ⇢ is set to 1, the CRA provides perfect information about the type of country and the
solution is the full information one. If, instead, ⇢ = 0, we are in the baseline model with
18⇢ can take on di↵erent values, 2 (0, 1), for a number of reasons that are not explicitly modelled here: for
example, a conflict of interest due to the issuer-pays model of rating fees would be represented as a decrease
in ⇢, as we go from an investors-pay to an issuer-pays model. Similarly, either the di culties of rating an
increasingly complex set of products or the lack of attention paid to sovereigns that do not pay for their
ratings would also imply a decrease in the parameter ⇢.
19That is because the r category reveals a type B country with certainty and, thus, is of no interest for
signalling. Alternatively I could model the r rating to be imperfectly informative as well. As the analysis is
analogous to that of the r¯ category, I opt for this simplified information structure of the signal.
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asymmetry of information from the previous section. For values between 0 and 1, the degree
of informativeness a↵ects to a lesser or greater extent the beliefs about the composition
of types in the rating category r¯ and, thus, the equilibrium debt price of pooling in that
category, which equals:
q⇤(D⇤2, p, ⇢ | r¯) =  0

p
1  ⇢(1  p)
 
1  F (D⇤2 + cA)
 
+
(1  ⇢)(1  p)
1  ⇢(1  p)
 
1  F (D⇤2 + cB)
  
.
Price is increasing in the prior about creditworthiness - p - and in the ratings capacity to
improve the prior with new information - ⇢. Both p and ⇢ make the lenders more optimistic
about creditworthiness (weighting up the beliefs that they are in front of a type A country
and down the beliefs that it is type B instead).
Let e⇤ be the least cost separating equilibrium defined in proposition 3.1 and p¯ be the
threshold level of the prior that makes type A indi↵erent between signaling and pooling as
described in the previous section.
Proposition 4.1. If the prior p is such that p < p¯, there exists a level of informativeness
⇢⇤ of the rating so that for all ⇢   ⇢⇤ all equilibria are pooling and for ⇢ < ⇢⇤ the unique
equilibrium is e⇤.
Proof. Since the equilibrium for p is e⇤, it follows that type A must prefer e⇤’s equilibrium
allocation to the pooling one:
UA
 
D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)
 
> UA (D⇤2(p), q(D
⇤
2(p), p))
= UA (D⇤2(pˆ), q(D
⇤
2(pˆ), pˆ)) if ⇢=0. (4.2)
The last line exploits the fact that the two problems without ratings and with ratings that
add no information are the same. The left-hand side of (4.2) is independent of ⇢, while the
right-hand side is increasing in ⇢ because @pˆ@⇢ |r¯> 0. And for ⇢ = 1   ✏, with ✏ very small,
the right-hand side tends to UA
 
DFI2 , q
A(DFI2 )
 
and the inequality is reversed. Hence, there
must exist a threshold ⇢⇤ where the equilibrium shifts from a pooling one to e⇤.
Thus,
Corollary 4.1. A deterioration of ratings informativeness from ⇢   ⇢⇤ to ⇢ < ⇢⇤ makes
‘signaling austerity’ appear.
A worse posterior pˆ(⇢) about the sovereign’s ability means that more type B countries
are perceived to be in the r¯ category and the pooling price is lower for every level of debt.
Price schedule q(D2, pˆ) shifts downwards as in the transition from figure 4a to figure 4b.
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(a) Equilibrium with ⇢   ⇢⇤. (b) Equilibrium with ⇢ < ⇢⇤.
Figure 4: A change in ⇢ induces a shift from a pooling (left panel) to a separating (right
panel) equilibrium.
If a pooling equilibrium exists, it will be on the new schedule. But, when ⇢ < ⇢⇤, any of
the allocations on this schedule is worse o↵ for A than the separating allocation, defeating
pooling equilibria. To sum up, a worse perception of the r¯-rated category makes it less
attractive for A to pool with the others, because the pooling price is low, and revealing the
type compensates the cost of austerity.
Think about a situation where the informativeness of the ratings was presumably high,
like before the 2008 financial crisis. Ratings are believed to be very informative and the
markets take them at face value and react strongly to them. The prediction of the model
is that all types of sovereigns would likely find it advantageous to pool at a high debt level.
They do not have an incentive to signal through costly austerity in order to overcome the
little residual asymmetry of information. However, if the informativeness of the ratings
plummets, for instance when the reputation of the rating agencies came into question after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the equilibrium may shift to a separating equilibrium. In
this new scenario, corollary 4.1 tells us to expect ‘signaling austerity’ as countries benefit
from standing out as creditworthy. The e↵ects of signaling will show in the price of debt,
which becomes more responsive to the fiscal magnitudes than before. In that way, you can
rationalize the surge in austerity in the European core countries in the aftermath of the
crisis and the increase in the Euro area sovereign spreads. In the next section, I simulate
the model for a number of periods and compare it with the time series data.
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4.2 A simple multiple-period model with iid shocks to the type
In this section, I extend the model to multiple periods. There are two cases in which this
extension can be done without excessive complications: the case with constant types over
time and the case with iid shocks to the type. With constant types, once there is a separating
equilibrium, the type is fully revealed. From then onward, each country chooses its optimal
amount of debt under perfect information. Signaling, hence, takes place at most once.
With independent shocks to the type, the problem changes in the following way: at the
end of period t a new type is drawn, cit+1. Then, the income realization !t is obtained and
the country may default. After a default, there is immediate re-entry in the debt market
and the country can borrow again Dt+1.
The solution to any two consecutive periods t and t + 1 is the same as that of the
previous two-period game.20 The reason is that the current realization of the type carries
no information about the type in the future and, thanks to the linear preferences and the
absence of a dynamic punishment for default, the optimal level of debt is independent from
the past stock of debt.
I simulate this economy during T = 28 to compare it with the last 28 years of data.
The parameters of the model are the following: the lender’s discount factor is normalized
to be  0 = 1; the sovereign’s discount factor is   = 0.6, lower than the lender’s to satisfy
assumption (A4); the minimum consumption in a type A country is normalized to cA = 0;
while in a type B country it is higher at cB = 1. The lower bound of the support of the
income distribution is ! = 1, which satisfies assumption (A2) with equality. The coe cient
of the exponential distribution of income h is set to 1, so the mean income is also 1. D1 !1
is set to 0 without loss of generality. Finally, the probability of being type A is set to be
30%.
I assume that the probability that the CRA detects a type B country, ⇢, is a parameter
that becomes known at the beginning of each period. I find the equilibrium of the model for
every value of ⇢ in a grid between [0, 1] and calculate the correlation between debt prices and
sovereign ratings as a function of ⇢. I choose the value of ⇢t that minimizes the di↵erence
between the simulated correlation and the correlation in the data each period.
Figure 5b depicts austerity in the data in the bars, measured as the sum of the pri-
mary balance of the government budgets over GDP weighted by the number of countries in
each period.21 The solid line plots the cross-section correlation between sovereign yields and
sovereign ratings for the same sample of countries between 1985 and 2012. The two vari-
ables have a negative co-movement: a high correlation between sovereign ratings and yields
20See appendix H for a proof.
21The sample is described in section 5.1 and can be found in appendix I.
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(a) Simulated data. (b) Actual data.
Figure 5: Negative co-movement between correlation and austerity.
happens with little or no austerity while a low correlation is associated with bar spikes in
austerity. Figure 5a plots the choice of ⇢t (dotted line), the cross-sectional correlation (solid
line) and the aggregate debt change implied by the model (bars). I am able to replicate the
negative co-movement that we see in the data.
Let us now focus on the evolution of sovereign yields over time. Figure 6 depicts the same
bars as before for the aggregate debt change, together with the simulated sovereign bond
yields of each country type. A period of separating equilibrium, characterized by austerity,
corresponds to the troughs in the bars. At those times, the sovereign yields of the two
country types diverge and a positive spread appears between sovereigns in the same rating
category. The prediction associated with a pooling equilibrium is the opposite: the debt
bars spike and the spread disappears.
The two empirical regularities that emerge in this simple multiple-period model - the
negative co-movement between the sovereign yields-ratings correlation and austerity and the
changes in yields dispersion with austerity - are used in the empirical analysis in the next
section.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section I go beyond the aggregate data from the previous section and examine indi-
vidual countries over three decades in a panel regression analysis. A given country’s choice
of fiscal policy is determined by a number of di↵erent variables that the literature has identi-
fied (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013). For instance,
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Figure 6: Simulated sovereign yields.
the stock of debt matters for debt sustainability and might a↵ect how much austerity a coun-
try engages in. In order to distinguish between how much austerity results from signaling
motives, I look at the evolution of austerity that is associated with changes in the incentives
to signal, conditional on fundamentals.
Incentives to signal are measured in two ways. The first measure I use is the cross-section
correlation between sovereign yields and sovereign ratings in a given period. This variable
proxies the market assessment of the ratings’ information. According to Corollary 4.1, the
less information there is (low ⇢) the more likely is a surge in austerity. This, controlling for
other determinants of the fiscal stance. I now explain how the ratings’ information is related
to the correlation variable in my model. Recall that Prob(r|B) = ⇢ and Prob(r|A) = 0 and,
in the setup with two ratings, it represents the information that the rating conveys to the
market. Since Cantor and Packer (1996), a large body of literature investigates the market
impact of credit ratings by regressing the sovereign yields, spreads and other measures of the
market value on the sovereign ratings.22 Following the literature, I estimate the equation:
Sovereign Yieldi,t = ⇢tRatingi,t + ✏i,t,
using cross-sectional variation. Hence, ⇢ˆt = corrt(Sovereign Yieldt,Ratingt) is an estimate
of the changes in public information that the sovereign ratings convey over time. Each year,
the correlation reflects the extent to which the sovereign yields charged by the lenders to all
sovereigns are explained by the order in which they are placed in the rating scale. A larger
22Possibly controlling for an array of covariates.
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correlation is presumed to mean a high ⇢ while a lower one implies a low ⇢. This is what I
also find in the simulation of the multiple-period economy in section 4.2 (see figure 5a).
An alternative way to identify austerity is to measure if market spreads are dispersing
within a given rating category. As shown in figure 6, increased dispersion in yields inside a
category is indicative of low informativeness of the ratings and should prompt austerity in
the separating equilibrium for that group of countries vis-a`-vis the other groups. I look for
extreme events in the yields of a sovereign within the yields distribution by rating category
in the data: the variable Yield Eventi,k,t represents the events in country i belonging to
the rating category k in year t and takes value 1 if a large change happened and 0 if not.
Rating categories are defined more coarsely than the rating grades in order to obtain a larger
number of countries in each category.23 I define a yield event as extreme when the di↵erence
in demeaned log yields between two consecutive years is larger than two standard deviations
of the log yields distribution in that year for that rating category.24 Demeaning allows me to
remove the time trend in the time series of yields. I use log yields because the interpretation
of di↵erences in log yields as percentage changes is useful and more realistic. In appendix J,
I present the list of countries experiencing such events. Finally, I aggregate the number of
events by rating category at every point in time, excluding those a↵ecting country j itself:
Yield Shocksj,k,t =
X
i2k,i 6=j
Yield Eventsi,k,t. (5.1)
I obtain an indicator variable that takes a higher value when more countries in j’s rating
category have price movements at the extremes of the distribution. My empirical strategy
then includes these variables that proxy for the willingness to signal - the Correlation or the
Yield Shocks - as a regressor ⇢ˆit in an equation of the fiscal stance:
Austerityit = ↵ +  ⇢ˆit +  Xit + ⇠it (5.2)
and let  ˆ capture the e↵ect that changes in these variables have on austerity, beyond what
can be explained by other variables included as controls in Xit.
Austerity is also proxied by two di↵erent variables, depending on the specification, as
summarized in table 1. The first is an indicator variable measuring whether a given country
was under a consolidation program. This is determined according to the narrative approach
by Devries et al. (2011) and the sample goes from 1978 to 2009 for 17 countries. The
23The rating categories are: ‘Prime’ for ratings between AAA and AAA-included, ‘Subprime’ for ratings
between Aa1+ and Aa3- included, ‘Investment’ between A1+ and Baa3- and ‘Non-investment’ lower or equal
to Ba1+.
24This is robust to small changes in the threshold of standard deviations.
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second proxy for austerity is a continuous variable for the cyclically adjusted primary balance
(CAPB). It is defined as ‘general government balance adjusted for nonstructural elements
beyond the economic cycle’ and data covers 58 countries from 1980 to 2011 and is taken
from the WEO database.
Table 1 recaps the main empirical specifications of equation (5.2) for di↵erent measures
of austerity (consolidation dummy/ CAPB) and the market assessment of the ratings’ infor-
mation (correlation between yields and ratings/ yield shocks). In the table I also report the
expected sign of the coe cient according to the implications of the model in section 4.2.
Table 1: Main empirical specifications and expected sign.
Independent variable:
MARKET ASSESSMENT
RATINGS’ INFORMATION
Correlation Yield Shocks
Dependent
variable:
AUSTERITY
Consolidation
dummy
negative positive
Cyclically adjusted
primary balance
negative positive
5.1 Dataset and description of the variables
The dataset contains observations at annual frequency for 58 countries over 32 years (1980–
2011). Countries covered principally include OECD countries, as well as a selection of
emerging market economies. For a complete list of countries and the range of years cov-
ered see appendix I. The economic variables included in the dataset are obtained from the
World Economic Outlook (IMF) 2013; the definitions and calculation methods are found in
appendix K. These include the following fiscal variables: Net lending/ borrowing, Primary
surplus/ deficit, CAPB, and Government expenditure. Positive values of these variables -
except expenditure - mean that the government is saving and negative values indicate that it
is borrowing. Hence, increased fiscal austerity is represented by a positive change in savings/
deficit or a negative change in expenditure.
The dataset has been merged with the average yield to maturity in percentage points of
long-term government bonds collected by the IMF in its International Financial Statistics
and with the data on fiscal consolidations programs by Devries et al. (2011). Finally, I
obtained historical data on sovereign ratings by the three biggest rating agencies (Moody’s,
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s) for my sample of countries. The rating grades (e.g. AAA)
were transformed into a numerical variable. I assigned each rating and modulation of the
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rating (outlook/ rating watch) a number on a scale ranging from 0 (default) to 52 (maximum
grade). The final Rating variable was obtained taking an annual average of the three ratings
(if available). Since each sampled country received an initial sovereign rating at di↵erent
points in time, the resulting panel is unbalanced.25
5.2 Evidence on ‘signaling austerity’
5.2.1 Results using the Correlation as the independent variable
The results presented below correspond to the first column of the specifications in table 1:
⇢t is proxied with the correlation variable throughout this section.
First, I use the consolidation episodes as a measure of austerity and I estimate equa-
tion (5.2) by probit:
Consolidation i,t = ↵ +  cCorrt +  Xi,t 1 + i + ⌧t + ✏i,t,
where Consolidationi,t is a dummy variable from Devries et al. (2011), that takes the value 1
if the country fiscally consolidates in that year and 0 if it does not; Corrt is the correlation26
variable estimating ⇢t; and Xi,t 1 are one-period-lagged control variables (Net lending over
GDP, Squared primary surplus, Debt over GDP, Squared debt over GDP, Log fiscal GDP,
Log GDP per capita and Growth). The specification includes country and year fixed e↵ects.
The coe cient  ˆc =  13.5 in table 2 is statistically di↵erent from zero. A lower correla-
tion variable has a positive e↵ect on the probability that the country is fiscally consolidating,
as expected.
I also estimate equation (5.2), letting primary deficit be the measure of austerity, using
OLS:
CAPBi,t = ↵ +  dCorrt +  Xi,t 1 + i + ✏i,t. (5.3)
The link from Corrt to CAPBi,t is hardly endogenous because the correlation is an
aggregate measure. One country’s austerity, CAPBi,t, might a↵ect its yields, which enter
the calculation of the correlation. But this variable is a measure of the relation between all
yields and all ratings in the sample, hence reverse causality from a given country’s austerity
CAPBi,t to the global Corrt is unlikely. As can be seen in table 3, the estimated coe cient
25However, there is no reason to believe that the initial observations for the non-rated countries are not
randomly missing.
26Correlations are calculated using the Spearman method to preserve the order of the ratings without
imposing a linear scale. Results from calculations using the Person correlation are also are available upon
request.
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Table 2: Panel probit
Consolidation dummy
Correlation -13.54**
(6.558)
Net lendingt 1 -0.295***
(0.0569)
Primary surplus2t 1 -0.0156*
(0.00879)
Debtt 1 -0.0129
(0.0280)
Debt2t 1 0.000175
(0.000108)
Log GDPt 1 3.669**
(1.653)
Log GDPpct 1 -2.859
(2.853)
Growtht 1 -4.587
(6.625)
Country FE Yes
Time FE Yes
N 369
Chi-square 102.1
Loglikelihood -137.2
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3: OLS with robust standard errors
CAPB
Correlation -1.809**
(0.805)
CAPBt 1 0.758***
(0.0461)
Primary surplus2t 1 0.000165
(0.00152)
Debtt 1 0.0575***
(0.0136)
Debt2t 1 -0.000190***
(0.0000569)
Log GDPt 1 -1.055
(0.919)
Log GDPpct 1 1.267
(2.155)
Growtht 1 1.992
(3.557)
Country FE Yes
Time FE No
N 607
R-square 0.821
F 51.84
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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 ˆd is negative and significant. The e↵ect of a 1 point decrease in the correlation implies a
1.8 percentage points increase in cyclically adjusted primary surplus over GDP. Since the
correlation is normalized to lie in the interval [0, 1], this increase in austerity is di cult to
interpret; hence, I use one standard deviation in the distribution of the Corrt variable as a
benchmark. Such a change would be responsible for a quarter percentage point change in
the structural deficit.
5.2.2 Robustness
I performed a series of robustness checks in order to assess whether results are consistent
through changes in some measures and specifications. First, I discuss the choice about
the measures of austerity. As mentioned in the introduction, there is no clear consensus
about the definition of austerity but the one I propose in this paper27 requires measuring the
discretionary fiscal decisions made by the government . I opted for the narrative approach, in
which Devries et al. (2011) identify episodes of fiscal consolidations through “policymakers’
intentions and actions as described in contemporaneous policy documents.” Their focus
is on fiscal actions motivated primarily by deficit reduction as a response to past economic
conditions. Hence this measure, by construction, is particularly well-suited for the analysis of
discretionary fiscal policy. I also show an alternative proxy for austerity, based on a statistical
measure, such as the CAPB. This is the most commonly used aggregate of discretionary fiscal
policy. One might wonder, though, whether other fiscal variables are also in line with the
results. I present three in table 4. Results are consistent with those in the previous section.
The Corr variable co-moves negatively with austerity, represented by larger surpluses and
lower expenditures. Coe cients are larger than that of CAPB: a change in Corr of one
standard deviation is associated with up to 0.48pp in austerity.
I then consider additional specifications in order to control for reverse causality. I replaced
the Corrt by the correlation calculated over a random subsample of half the countries (J) in
the sample and estimate the following regression for the other countries:
Yi,t = ↵ +  Corr
J
t +  Xi,t 1 + i + ✏i,t 8i /2 J. (5.4)
by OLS. In (5.4) the fiscal position Yi,t cannot a↵ect CorrJt as a consequence of the compu-
tation method because the correlation is calculated for a di↵erent subsample. Table 5 shows
that the e↵ect found in the previous regressions still holds.
Next, I instrument Corrt in (5.3) with two instruments: the annual stock prices of the
27A lower debt choice than that of the full information solution due to the signaling motive (see the
definition of ‘austerity for signaling purposes’ on page 11).
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Table 4: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus Expenditure
Correlation -3.562*** -2.913*** 3.260***
(0.883) (0.839) (0.786)
Net lendingt 1 0.740***
(0.0503)
Primary surplust 1 0.723***
(0.0485)
Expendituret 1 0.757***
(0.0409)
Primary surplus2t 1 0.00717 0.00653 -0.00580
(0.00474) (0.00452) (0.00560)
Debtt 1 0.0893*** 0.112*** -0.0649***
(0.0158) (0.0161) (0.0155)
Debt2t 1 -0.000358*** -0.000448*** 0.000267***
(0.0000742) (0.0000775) (0.0000704)
Log GDPt 1 -0.929 -1.818** 0.328
(0.784) (0.826) (0.777)
Log GDPpct 1 1.825 2.712 -0.696
(2.150) (2.155) (2.199)
Growtht 1 13.55*** 12.28*** -10.59***
(4.189) (4.095) (4.002)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 741 740 741
r2 0.764 0.730 0.960
F 38.72 32.82 862.2
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: OLS with robust standard errors
Consolidation Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
CorrelationJ -1.745** -2.566** -3.492*** -1.547* 1.628*
(0.827) (1.041) (1.007) (0.874) (0.937)
Net lendingt 1 0.672***
(0.0693)
Primary surplust 1 0.572***
(0.0908)
CAPBt 1 0.729***
(0.0791)
Expendituret 1 0.797***
(0.0478)
Primary surplus2t 1 0.000522 -0.000698 -0.00694 0.00208
(0.00556) (0.00501) (0.00775) (0.00610)
Debtt 1 0.0541** 0.0505* 0.0713*** 0.0446** -0.0352
(0.0215) (0.0286) (0.0266) (0.0185) (0.0238)
Debt2t 1 -0.000102 -0.000147 -0.000268* -0.000122 0.0000570
(0.0000956) (0.000156) (0.000149) (0.0000827) (0.000126)
Log GDPt 1 1.460 0.316 -0.222 -0.660 -1.673**
(1.019) (0.960) (0.979) (1.184) (0.838)
Log GDPpct 1 -6.899** -1.976 -0.510 0.0944 5.574**
(2.781) (2.812) (2.816) (2.883) (2.457)
Growtht 1 -2.230 2.894 3.120 1.181 0.0566
(5.927) (5.141) (5.269) (5.891) (4.130)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 217 465 464 286 465
r2 0.632 0.664 0.802 0.961
F 30.60 29.08 49.22 1123.1
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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company Moody’s and the number of negative news about the CRAs. Moody’s is one of
the big rating agencies and it is quoted in the stock exchange since 1998 (ticker: MCO). I
retrieved information on its stock prices (yearly averages) from Bloomberg. I also collected
the number of news counts in major distribution newspapers (in English) that contain a
negative view of the rating agencies from the LexisNexis database.28
The first underlying assumption is that Moody’s stock price reflects the ability of the
agency to assign informative ratings. The second assumption is that the opinion of experts
and the media on the rating agencies’ ability is informative. The relevance of these variables
to explain the Corrt can further be assessed by looking at the results of the first stage
instrumental variables regression in the table in appendix L. On the other hand, neither
Moody’s stock price nor the critical opinions about the rating agencies should directly a↵ect
any given country’s willingness to implement austerity; it should only a↵ect this willingness
indirectly through the e↵ect they have on the correlation via the signaling channel. In table 6
results are confirmed for several austerity measures and the magnitude of the e↵ect is larger
than in the previous estimations.
Further, I also exploit the time-series dimension of the data by substituting Corrt with
its one period lag. Since the correlation at t   1 is predetermined when looking at it from
the current period, it cannot be a↵ected by the austerity that takes place at period t. Xi,t 1
contains the lagged dependent variables (Net lending, Primary surplus, CAPB, Expenditure),
Debt over GDP, Squared debt over GDP, Log fiscal GDP, Log GDP per capita and Growth.
In order to deal with possible error autocorrelation, regression (5.3) has been estimated using
the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator.29 The Corrt 1 is instrumented with further lags of the
same variable. As reported in table 7, there is no autocorrelation left in the residuals. I also
apply the correction for small samples. Results in table 7 confirm the previous ones and are
significant. Robust estimators are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.
5.2.3 Results using the Yield Shocks as the independent variable
Here I present the results of the estimation corresponding to the specifications in the second
column of table 1. The independent variable in this section is the Yield Shocks. The following
specification:
Yj,k,t = ↵ +  dYield Shocksj,k,t 1 +  Xj,t 1 + j + ⌧t + uj,t, (5.5)
28Search key words were ‘rating agencies, reputation, accuracy & criticism’, ‘rating agencies, credibility
& mistake or error or blame’, ‘rating agencies, reputation & regulation’ and an example article would be:
‘Rating agencies: Capable or culpable?’, Euromoney November 2007.
29The Arellano-Bond estimator in di↵erences uses first di↵erentiation to eliminate the autocorrelated fixed
component of the error term.
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Table 6: IV regression results
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Correlationt 1 -18.49*** -18.04*** -4.092* 14.44***
(3.377) (3.790) (2.418) (2.928)
Net lendingt 1 0.504***
(0.0387)
Primary surplust 1 0.534***
(0.0393)
CAPBt 1 0.630***
(0.0382)
Expendituret 1 0.542***
(0.0385)
Debtt 1 0.0674*** 0.110*** 0.0515*** -0.0514***
(0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0137) (0.0170)
Debt2t 1 -0.0000956 -0.000231** -0.0000983 0.0000908
(0.0000927) (0.0000957) (0.0000624) (0.0000806)
Log GDPt 1 -0.799 -2.040*** -1.800*** 0.0419
(0.728) (0.747) (0.495) (0.632)
Log GDPpct 1 5.418*** 7.459*** 1.602 -0.421
(1.768) (2.227) (1.377) (1.522)
Growtht 1 4.943 1.958 2.564 -3.265
(3.914) (4.471) (2.899) (3.396)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 611 541 513 611
R-square 0.726 0.722 0.807 0.955
F 27.98 25.93 40.55 212.9
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: GMM with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Correlationt 1 -4.788*** -4.454*** -2.573*** 3.789***
(1.108) (1.321) (0.879) (0.827)
Net lendingt 1 0.507***
(0.101)
Primary surplust 1 0.461***
(0.134)
CAPBt 1 0.722***
(0.115)
Expendituret 1 0.648***
(0.118)
Debtt 1 0.220 0.236*** 0.227*** -0.285**
(0.146) (0.0818) (0.0834) (0.128)
Debt2t 1 -0.000475 -0.000616 -0.000863 0.00115
(0.000807) (0.000557) (0.000517) (0.000809)
Log GDPt 1 -3.842 -3.769 1.166 3.236
(6.798) (6.656) (4.499) (4.879)
Log GDPpct 1 11.55 8.179 -2.572 -9.088
(19.05) (17.80) (11.63) (13.65)
Growtht 1 25.82*** 29.90*** 8.965** -15.47*
(8.767) (7.788) (3.898) (8.596)
N 821 718 659 821
hansen 48.61 43.15 36.46 48.79
AR(1) 0.00182 0.0150 0.00634 0.00302
AR(2) 0.0466 0.0457 0.115 0.112
F 26.07 21.37 26.85 26.19
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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estimates how the number of extreme yield events in a rating category a↵ects the fiscal
position of the countries in that rating category in the next period.
Table 8: Panel probit
Consolidation dummy
Yield shocks 0.389*
(0.211)
Net lendingt 1 -0.306***
(0.0527)
Primary surplus2t 1 -0.0112
(0.00907)
Debtt 1 0.0152
(0.0208)
Debt2t 1 0.0000294
(0.000102)
Log GDPt 1 2.066
(1.262)
Log GDPpct 1 -7.147**
(3.216)
Growtht 1 11.91**
(6.070)
Country FE Yes
N 335
Chi-square 83.58
Loglikelihood -130.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note that the definition of Yield Shocks in equation (5.1) does not include country j’s
own yields events; it contains only information about other countries in the same rating
category. Moreover, in order to be more careful, the independent variable is lagged one
period. Finally, I also exclude from the estimation those countries experiencing a yield event
or a rating change between t  1 and t. The objective is that the yield shocks are exogenous
to the countries’ fiscal position Yj,k,t and the e↵ect on austerity comes from the change in
information alone. Xj,t includes the usual controls and the lagged ratings.30
30In order to control for any other domestic reason that a↵ects the fiscal stance.
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Table 9: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Yield shockst 1 0.533*** 0.601*** 0.294** -0.247**
(0.154) (0.166) (0.116) (0.118)
Net lendingt 1 0.684***
(0.0416)
Primary surplust 1 0.738***
(0.0412)
CAPBt 1 0.725***
(0.0521)
Expendituret 1 0.762***
(0.0299)
Debtt 1 -0.00823 0.0000688 -0.00352 0.0120**
(0.00580) (0.00586) (0.00532) (0.00552)
Log GDPt 1 -1.467** -1.981*** -2.267** 1.089*
(0.682) (0.727) (0.963) (0.640)
Log GDPpct 1 0.714 2.430 3.098* 1.329
(1.466) (1.640) (1.823) (1.361)
Growtht 1 5.198 0.501 5.121 -4.315
(3.792) (4.170) (6.206) (3.534)
Ratingt 1 -0.0837** -0.0776* -0.0684* 0.0418
(0.0372) (0.0431) (0.0380) (0.0341)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 885 772 653 885
r2 0.838 0.831 0.870 0.978
F 45.85 40.75 99.59 783.4
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The regression results for this specification are presented in tables 8 (independent vari-
able: consolidation dummy) and 9 (independent variables: net lending, primary surplus,
CAPB, expenditure). Note that when more countries in your rating category are subject to
a yield event, it means a larger number in the variable Yield Shocks i,k,t. Hence, an increase
in the explanatory variable is associated with more austerity (an increase in the probability
of a fiscal consolidation,  ˆc > 0, or higher values in the primary surplus,  ˆd > 0) as expected.
This approach confirms the results from previous sections. Experiencing a yield shock in
your rating category increases the austerity over GDP on the order of one half percentage
points of net borrowing or primary deficit and about one quarter of CAPB. For example,
the primary deficit over GDP would go from 3.5% to 3%.
5.3 Alternative explanations
There could be alternative theories explaining the empirical results. I list a selection and
discuss them in this section.
First, in order to rule out that austerity is due to criteria of budget sustainability, I control
in all above regressions for a set of individual characteristics that the literature identifies as
important (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Favero and Monacelli, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2013) and
the results all survive.
However, there might still be missing unobservable characteristics. This is a problem
insofar the omitted variable is correlated with Corrt. Suppose that we are estimating this
regression:
Yi,t = ↵ +  Corrt +  Xi,t 1 + i + ✏i,t, (5.6)
where in reality ✏i,t = Zt + ui,t and Corr(Xi,t 1, Zt) 6= 0. Then, Corr(Xi,t 1, ✏i,t) 6= 0 and
estimation by OLS would produce biased coe cients. Concerns about omitted variables,
e.g. global uncertainty, are addressed by including country and time fixed e↵ects in the
last specification (5.5). The e↵ect of changes in information on austerity remains after the
omitted variables are controlled for.
There could also be omitted variables that a↵ect only some countries and not others.
Particularly problematic is the case when an omitted variable a↵ects the countries in some
particular category only. In this case the e↵ects could be confounded with the e↵ects of the
yield events operating at the level of the rating category and we would be unsure whether
we were capturing the correct e↵ect. For example, think about precautionary savings by
countries within a rating category triggered by uncertainty clustered at the category level.
Note, though, that the precautionary motive should be homogenous in all countries within
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a given category. But austerity by category shows high dispersion. This indicates that
austerity is not implemented by every country, as would be consistent with the precautionary
motive, but only by some countries that belong in the category a↵ected by a price change,
as consistent with the signaling motive.
The results obtained here could also be attributed to contagion. A shock to a country is
transmitted to others, even if they are not directly hit. By the nature of contagion, it cannot
be captured by controlling for the fundamentals of the country as I did before. In order to
detect contagion among countries, the literature usually relies on price co-movements, thus
implying that contagion should matter-of-factly show in the price of debt. Controlling for
the country’s own lagged log yields and the lagged rating in specification (5.5), as I do in
appendix M, I still find an e↵ect of changes in the ratings information content.
One issue that remains is that we cannot predict what each type does because types are
not observable (neither in theory nor in the data). But we can work around that in the
following ways: one is to use regional sub-samples. I repeat the same regression (5.2) on
the sample split by regions (OECD countries, European Union countries, peripheral Euro-
pean countries and emerging market economies). The e↵ect of a decrease in the correlation
is qualitatively the same, however, it becomes less significant for the group of peripheral
countries and it is not significant for emerging markets (see appendix N for further details).
According to the model, this would be expected if there were a higher proportion of type B
countries in these two groups relative to the OECD and EU groups.
Another way is to use a two-stage strategy. In a first stage, I find the proximity to being
a ‘good type’ based on past observable information, where ‘good’ is defined tautologically as
those countries overshooting austerity from that predicted by the fitted regression (5.5). In
the second stage I can use the predicted proximity to good type/ austerian to explain the
CAPB. It turns out that the more the observable variables predict a country to behave as
a ‘good’ type in a certain year, the higher its out of sample austerity really is (coe cient:
1.201, standard deviation: 0.177).31
6 Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper I show that a sovereign may use fiscal policy as a signal to communicate its
ability to repay public debt. In the empirical analysis I find that sovereigns adopt a more
austere fiscal policy when the credit ratings are less informative about a country creditwor-
thiness. This result is robust to di↵erent empirical strategies, specifications and measures of
austerity. The evidence favors the signaling channel over other alternative explanations.
31The first stage regression uses years 1980 to 2000 and the out of sample prediction 2000 to 2011.
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The findings in this paper are relevant for policymakers wishing to implement austerity
programs in order to reduce the risk of a sovereign default. For instance, during the recent
debt crisis several European countries adopted a common debt ceiling.32 In my model this
policy is equivalent to setting an exogenous debt limit that is the same for any country
type. The introduction of a debt limit may make the optimal choice of debt unfeasible
if it is stringent enough. Hence, it triggers a change in the equilibrium that prevails. If
the undefeated equilibrium is separating, both countries are worse o↵ because they cannot
choose their constrained optimal debt level and the incentive compatibility constraint of the
less able country is harder to satisfy. If the undefeated equilibrium is pooling, instead, both
types are still worse o↵, otherwise they could have chosen to pool at that debt level in the
unrestricted set-up. In some cases, as in the example in appendix O, the overall riskiness
of debt increases. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ austerity program, such as the Fiscal Compact, may
backfire when countries are trying to signal with austerity.33
32The Fiscal Compact introduced the rule of fiscal budget balance in its Article 3 of Title II.
33In a di↵erent set-up with homogeneous countries and limited commitment, introducing a debt ceiling
could instead be useful to overcome the commitment problem.
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APPENDIX
A The single crossing property
The single crossing condition of indi↵erence curves is defined as a ranking of the slopes of the
indi↵erence curves U i(D2, q) such that  A(D2, q) <  B(D2, q) for all D2, q in the relevant
range, where  i(D2, q) :=  
@Ui(D2,q)
@D2
@Ui(D2,q)
@q
. Let us show that the indi↵erence curves of country
type A are flatter than those of country type B. First, let us define the relevant range of D2.
Let Di2 be the threshold level of debt that satisfies constraint (2.5) for t = 1 for each type:
Di2 =
ci   !1 +D1
 0
⇥
1  F (Di2 + ci)
⇤ . (A.1)
Substituting F (·) for its functional form, we obtain:
Di2 =
ci   !1 +D1
 0
eh(c
i !)ehD
i
2 . (A.2)
Since ehD
i
2 is bounded between 0 and 1, Di2 > 0. Moreover, since c
A < cB, DA2 < D
B
2 . Thus,
the relevant range of D2 is [D
B
2 ,1).
Next, let us compute  i(D2, q) for each type. Total di↵erentiation of equation (2.6) gives:
0 = D2 · dq+
+
⇥
q +  F 0(D2 + ci)ci    F 0(D2 + ci)(D2 + ci) +  F 0(D2 + ci)D2    
 
1  F (D2 + ci)
 ⇤ · dD2
and, simplifying,
0 = D2 · dq +
⇥
q      1  F (D2 + ci) ⇤ · dD2.
Therefore,  i(D2, q) =   q  (1 F (D2+c
i))
D2
and  A(D2, q) <  B(D2, q) if  i(D2, q) < 0, which
is the case for all D2 2 [DB2 , 0) given assumption (A4).
B Full information optimal allocation
Let us show that the optimal level of debt under full information DFI2 is a local maximum.
Di↵erentiating the FOC (3.2) with respect to D2 and rearranging gives:
F 00
 
D2 + c
i
    0D2    0 F 0 (D2 + ci)
F 00 (D2 + ci)
+ ( 0    )h 1
 
. (B.1)
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In order to sign the previous expression, substitute F (!) for its functional form 1  e h! !.
F 00(!) < 0 and for equation (B.1) to be negative it must be that
  0D2    0 F
0 (D2 + ci)
F 00 (D2 + ci)
+ ( 0    )h 1 > 0,
therefore,
D2 <
 0    
 0h
+
1
h
. (B.2)
The derivative of the FOC is negative when (B.2) holds. Since DFI2 =
 0  
 0h and h > 0, the
expression (B.1) is negative at DFI2 and D
FI
2 is a local maximum.
C Separating equilibrium
We show that the allocation
⇥ 
D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)
 
,
 
DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)
 ⇤
, along with beliefs µ⇤
 
D B2
 
=
1, and µ⇤ (D2) = 0 for D2 6= D B2 , constitutes a separating equilibrium outcome. Recall that
D B2 is the debt level that satisfies type B’s incentive compatibility constraint (3.5) with
equality:
UB(D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)) = U
B(DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)). (C.1)
Let DA,B2 be the debt level most preferred by type A under the price schedule q(D2, 0).
Now let us define qi(D2, U) as the indirect function that gives the price of debt necessary
to keep type i’s utility constant at U for a given debt D2. qi(·) is continuous and one-to-one.
If U¯ = UB(DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)) is the utility level of country B in the full information equilibrium,
qB(DFI2 , U¯) is equal to the price q(D
FI
2 , 0) by definition. On the other hand, we know that
q(D2, 0) < q(D2, 1) 8D2 and, in particular, for DFI2 . Therefore,
qB(D
FI
2 , U¯) = q(D
FI
2 , 0) < q(D
FI
2 , 1).
Hence, qB(DFI2 , U¯) lies below q(D
FI
2 , 1). Now let us check how these two functions behave
to the left of DFI2 :
q(DB2 , 1) =  
0 ⇥1  F (DB2 + cA)⇤
is positive and bounded and limD2!DB2 qB(D2, U¯) = +1.
In the limit qB(D2, U¯) is above q(D2, 1). Since q(., 1) is continuous in D2 and so is
qB(D2, U¯) for D2 6= 0, qB(D2, U¯) and q(D2, 1) must intersect at some D2 between DB2 and
DFI2 . Hence, there exists aD
 B
2 2 [DB2 , DFI2 ] such that the isoutility curve of B going through 
DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)
 
crosses the price schedule q(D2, 1).
It remains to be proven that type A prefers choosing D B2 and having the price of
debt q(D B2 , 1) to choosing D
A,B
2 and having the price q(D
A,B
2 , 0). First, note that the
full information allocation is optimal for type B, hence, it is its highest isoutility curve under
39
the q(D2, 0) schedule. It follows that the price schedule q(D2, 0) must lie below B’s isoutility
curve going through the full information allocation for all D2 6= DFI2 . So, in order to satisfy
the tangency condition of DA,B2 for type A, the allocation (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) must be below
the isoutility curve of B going through (DFI2 , q(D
FI
2 , 0)). And, given that the isoutility curves
of A in (D2, q) are steeper than those of B for any D2, the two can only cross to the right
of DA,B2 . Since they cannot cross to the left of D
A,B
2 it is impossible that (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0))
is on a higher isoutility curve of A than (D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)). Otherwise, it would be preferred
by B as well and that is a contradiction to (C.1).
D Pooling equilibrium at DFI2
In order to show that there can be a pooling equilibrium at the full information debt level,
note that B’s utility level pooling at (DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p)) must be higher than the full informa-
tion allocation (DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 0)) because the debt level is the same but the price is better.
Since µ⇤(D2) = 0 for any D2 6= DFI2 , type B’s optimal choice of D⇤2(B) is DFI2 . At the same
time, A’s utility at (DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p)) also needs to be higher than at its preferred allocation
under the q(D2, 0) schedule, (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)). By contradiction, for (D
A,B
2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) to
be preferred, UA going through it must cross q(·, p) at some point between DA,B2 and DFI2 .
At DA,B2 , q(D
A,B
2 , p) > q(D
A,B
2 , 0) and, as D2 ! 1, the limD2!1 q(D2, p) > 0 and the
indi↵erence curve going through (DA,B2 , q(D
A,B
2 , 0)) goes to 0. Continuity and monotonicity
of q(D2, p) is straightforward and of the indi↵erence curve has been shown in appendix B.
Hence, they cannot cross to the right of DA,B2 , and D
FI
2 is type A’s optimal choice. To sum
up, DFI2 is the optimal choice of both A and B given the system of beliefs and, therefore, by
Bayes’ rule, µ = p at DFI2 .
E Definition of the Undefeated Equilibrium refinement
Let e⇤ and e0 be two equilibria of the game and {(D⇤2(i), q⇤;µ⇤(·))}i2{A,B} and {(D02(i), q0;µ0(·))}i2{A,B}
its respective outcomes. If:
1. D02 is a non-equilibrium outcome in e
⇤.
2. ⇥ = {{A}, {B}, {A,B}, {;}} is the set of types that choose strategy D02 in e0.
3. Denoting U i(e) the utility of type i under equilibrium e:
U i(e0)   U i(e) 8i 2 ⇥,
with the inequality being strict for at least one i 2 ⇥.
4. The o↵-equilibrium beliefs after observing D02 in e
⇤, µ⇤(D02), are positive for the type(s)
with a strict inequality and zero for the type(s) not belonging to ⇥,
then, whenever µ⇤(D02) do not support e
⇤, e⇤ is defeated by e0.
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F Selection of the separating equilibrium e⇤
For e⇤ to be the unique equilibrium it must be that: a) e⇤ is undefeated and b) it defeats all
other equilibria.
a) e⇤ is defeated if there is an equilibrium e0 whose µ0 at D02 is not consistent with e
⇤. Note
that this can only happen:
• To the right of D B2 if 8D2 2 [DB2 , D B2 ] q(D2, µ) > q(D2, 1), which is impossible
according to the definition of PBE.
• To the left of D B2 any possible equilibria are of the pooling type. Hence, equilibrium
beliefs are q(D2, µ) = q(D2, p) and q(D2, p) needs to be above A’s isoutility curve
going through
 
D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)
 
.
Thus, q(D2, p) < q(D2, U¯A), where U¯A = UA
 
D B2 , q(D
 B
2 , 1)
 
, is the condition for e⇤ to
survive.34 The condition holds for a su ciently low p:
p < 1 +
U¯A   !1 +D1 + (2     0) (1  F (D2 + cA))   (1 + cA +D2 + h 1)
 0D2 (F (D2 + cB)  F (D2 + cA))
.
For example, for  0 = 1,   = 0.6, cA = 0, cB = 1, h = 1 and D1   !1 = 0, any p < 1
would work.
b) Now, take e⇤ that is undefeated. This means that U i(e⇤)   U i(e0) 8i, with strict inequality
for at least one i, for any other equilibrium e0. On the other hand, o↵-equilibrium beliefs
in equilibrium e0 must be µ0(D2) 6= 1 8D2 6= D02 in order to be able to sustain e0. But,
since ⇥ = {A} for D B2 in e⇤ and UA(e⇤) > UA(e0), µ0(D B2 ) = 1 and any e0 is defeated
by e⇤.
G Selection of the pooling equilibria
Let us show that a pooling equilibrium e0 can defeat the least cost separating equilibrium e⇤.
e0 will defeat e⇤ if UA(e0)   UA(e⇤) and UB(e0) > UB(e⇤). D02 is not an equilibrium strategy
for A in e⇤ but both types choose D02 in e
0, hence ⇥ = {A,B}. O↵-equilibrium beliefs about
the type(s) that choose D02 in e
⇤ need to be positive for both A and B. Hence,
µ⇤(D2) =
8><>:
p ifD02
1 ifD B2
0 otherwise.
Condition UB(e0) > UB(e⇤), i.e. UB(DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p)) > U
B(DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 0)), is clearly
true. And for its A counterpart, UA(DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p))   UA((D B2 , q⇤(D B2 , 1)), it su ces to
34q(·) has been defined as the function that maps (D2, U¯A) to q: R⇥ R! R+.
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choose a p that is close enough to 1. Take, for example, 1   ✏, where ✏ is very small. Note
that
UA(DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p)) = p
⇥
UA
 
DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 1)
 ⇤
+ (1  p) ⇥UA  DFI2 , q⇤(DFI2 , 0) ⇤
and that
UA
 
DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 1)
 
> UA
 
D B2 , q
⇤(D B2 , 1)
 
,
because it is the full information solution. Thus, using p = 1  ✏,
UA(DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , p)) = (1  ✏)
⇥
UA
 
DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 1)
 ⇤
+ ✏
⇥
UA
 
DFI2 , q
⇤(DFI2 , 0)
 ⇤
> UA(
 
D B2 , q
⇤(D B2 , 1)
 
.
H Multiple-period model
Let us show that the multiple period problem with iid shocks to the type is the same as the
repetition of the two-period model. We will construct our model backwards, starting from
the two period version of the model. Recall the two-period sovereign problem. When D2
is chosen the borrower knows his type ci2. By analogy, we will keep this important timing
assumption. With the aim of writing the general multi-period problem, we write the two-
period problem emphasizing the relevant states and eliminating the time subscript. Future
choices are indicated with prime. Moreover, we write the generalized version of it with an
arbitrary initial level of debt D and endowment ! and allowing the possibility of default.
Let
u(D,!, c) := max {c,!  D}
be the flow value in each period considering the default choice and assuming that the choice
of default occurs before issuing the new debt.
max
D0,c
c+  
Z 1
!
u(D0,!0, c0)f(!0)d!0 (H.1)
subject to
c =
(
!  D + q(D0, µ(D0))D0 if ! > D + c,
c+ q(D0, µ(D0))D0 otherwise;
The borrower takes as given the price schedule and the belief schedule that generates it. For
all D0 and µ(D0) consistent with lender optimality and competition in the lending market,
we have: q(D0, µ(D0)) =  0 [µ(D0)( 1   F (D0 + cA) )+(1  µ(D0))( 1   F (D0 + cB ))] . In the
baseline version of the model in the main text, we assumed fixed types and no default in the
first period.
Before moving to three or more periods note that - thanks to the linearity of preferences,
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the previous problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
D0
u(D,!, c) + q(D0, µ(D0))D0 +  
Z 1
!
u(D0,!0, c0)f(!0)d!0 (H.2)
=u(D,!, c) +W1(c
0, µ), (H.3)
where
W1(c
0, µ) := max
D0
q(D0, µ(D0))D0 +  
Z 1
!
u(D0,!0, c0)f(!0)d!0.
This formulation emphasizes an important stationary property of our model with linear
preferences: the decision of future debt is only function of the type the borrower knows at
the moment of re-payment. In particular, it does not depend on the initial outstanding debt
or the previous type of the borrower. The simple default condition arises from the assumption
that there is no dynamic punishment for default. We now move to three periods. We assume
that types cit are drawn independently across time, with support {A,B} and probability p
and 1   p, respectively. We can consider the previous two-period model as the last two
periods of a three-period model. Assuming the lender beliefs schedule - and hence the price
schedule q - is time constant, we can define
V2(D,!, c, µ) := u(D,!, c) + pW1(c
A, µ) + (1  p)W1(cB, µ) (H.4)
We can hence define the function W2 recursively as follows:
W2(c, µ) := max
D
q(D,µ(D))D +  
Z 1
!
V2(D,!, c, µ)f(!)d!.
Given that we derived the recursive formulation of the three period problem, the extension
to an arbitrary number of periods is immediate. The Bellman equation is as follows. For
any level of debt D, endowment ! and initial type ci we have
Vt(D,!, c, µ) = u(D,!, c) + pWt 1(cA, µ) + (1  p)Wt 1(cB, µ),
where for all c 2 {cA, cB} :
Wt 1(c, µ) = max
D
q(D,µ(D))D +  
Z 1
!
Vt 1(D,!, c, µ)f(!)d!.
In other terms, if we exclude the fact that the number of remaining periods decreases,
each period can be seen as any other one with di↵erent initial conditions. The default
decision will be always determinate by the di↵erence ! D, justifying the stationarity of the
price schedule q. In our linear set-up, the initial conditions do not a↵ect the shape of the
indi↵erence curve (as they only shift them in a parallel fashion). Both the full information
optimal debt level, DFI =  
0  
 0h , and the condition for the separating equilibrium debt level,
D B: UB(D B, q(D B, 1)) = UB(DFI , q(DFI , 0)) remain the same. The single crossing
condition property is also maintained, hence, the solution to the problem between any two
periods.
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I The ratings geography and time span
Country Moody’s Fitch S&P Country Moody’s Fitch S&P
Australia 1980 1996 1980 Malawi - 2003-09 -
Austria 1980 1995 1980 Malta 1994 1997 1994
Belgium 1980 1995 1989 Mexico 1991 1996 1993
Botswana 2001 - 2001 Morocco 1999 2007 1998
Bulgaria 1997 1998 1999 Netherlands 1986 1995 1989
Canada 1980 1995 1980 New Zealand 1980 2000 1980
Cyprus 1996 2002 1994 Norway 1980 1995 1980
Czech Republic 1993 1996 1994 Pakistan 1995 - 1995
Denmark 1980 1995 1981 Papua New Guinea 1999 1999 1999
Estonia 1998 1998 1998 Philippines 1994 1999 1994
Fiji 1997 - 2007 Poland 1995 1996 1995
Finland 1980 1995 1980 Portugal 1987 1995 1989
France 1980 1995 1980 Romania 1996 1996 1996
Germany 1986 1995 1984 Russia 1997 1997 1997
Ghana - 2004 2004 Seychelles - 2010 2007-09
Greece 1991 1996 1989 Singapore 1990 1999 1989
Guatemala 1998 2006 2002 Slovak Republic 1995 1997 1994
Honduras 1999 - 2009 Slovenia 1996 1997 1996
Hungary 1990 1996 1992 South Africa 1995 1995 1995
Iceland 1989 2000 1989 Spain 1988 1995 1989
India 1988 2000 1991 Sri Lanka 2011 2006 2006
Ireland 1988 1995 1989 Sweden 1980 1995 1980
Italy 1987 1995 1989 Switzerland 1982 1995 1989
Jamaica 1998 2007 2000 Thailand 1990 1998 1989
Japan 1982 1995 1980 Trinidad and Tobago 1993 - 1996
Korea 1987 1996 1989 Uganda - 2005 2009
Latvia 1998 1998 1997 United Kingdom 1980 1995 1980
Lithuania 1997 1997 1997 United States 1980 1995 1980
Luxembourg 1990 1995 1995 Venezuela 1980 1998 1980
44
J Yield Events
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year
Czech Republic 2003 Pakistan 1992 Cyprus 2006 New Zealand 1992
Greece 2010 Portugal 2011 Ethiopia 1987 Norway 1993
Honduras 1994 South Africa 1988 Honduras 1997 Norway 2004
Honduras 1996 Sri Lanka 1991 Italy 1984 Norway 2009
Iceland 2008 Switzerland 1994 Japan 1992 Pakistan 2003
Jamaica 1985 Switzerland 1999 Japan 1997 Seychelles 2003
Jamaica 1990 Switzerland 2003 Japan 1998 Singapore 2007
Japan 1990 Thailand 2004 Japan 2001 Slovenia 1993
Japan 1999 Uganda 1984 Japan 2007 Slovenia 1994
Lithuania 2009 Uganda 1985 Korea 1981 Solomon Islands 2004
Luxembourg 2006 Uganda 1986 Korea 1982 Solomon Islands 2005
Malawi 1995 Uganda 1989 Korea 1983 Switzerland 2000
New Zealand 1996 United States 2005 Latvia 2011 Switzerland 2002
Norway 1998 Lithuania 2010 Switzerland 2008
Luxembourg 1988 Switzerland 2011
Mexico 2001 Thailand 1987
Namibia 2001 Vanuatu 1989
Nepal 1991 Vanuatu 2008
K Dataset: definition of variables
General government gross debt (Debt, % GDP): Gross debt consists of all liabilities
that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the
creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of
SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standard-
ized guarantee schemes, as well as other accounts payable (World Economic Outlook
2013, WEO13).
General government net lending/ borrowing (Net lending, % GDP): Net lending
(+)/ borrowing (-) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure. It is also equal
to net acquisition of financial assets minus net incurrence of liabilities (WEO13).
General government primary net lending/ borrowing (Primary surplus, % GDP):
Primary net lending/ borrowing is net lending (+)/ borrowing (-) plus net interest
payable/ paid (interest expense minus interest revenue) (WEO13).
General government structural balance (CAPB, national currency): The structural
budget balance refers to the general government cyclically adjusted balance adjusted
for nonstructural elements beyond the economic cycle. These include temporary fi-
nancial sector and asset price movements as well as one-o↵, or temporary, revenue or
expenditure items. The cyclically adjusted balance is the fiscal balance adjusted for
the e↵ects of the economic cycle (WEO13).
General government structural balance (CAPB, % potential GDP): The structural
budget balance refers to the general government cyclically adjusted balance adjusted
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for nonstructural elements beyond the economic cycle. These include temporary fi-
nancial sector and asset price movements as well as one-o↵, or temporary, revenue or
expenditure items. The cyclically adjusted balance is the fiscal balance adjusted for
the e↵ects of the economic cycle (WEO13).
General government total expenditure (Expenditure, % GDP): Total expenditure
consists of total expense and the net acquisition of non-financial assets (WEO13).
GDP corresponding to fiscal year, current prices (GDP, billions of national currency):
Gross domestic product corresponding to fiscal year is the country’s GDP based on
the same period during the year as their fiscal data. In the case of countries whose
fiscal data are based on a fiscal calendar (e.g., July to June), this series would be the
country’s GDP over that same period. For countries whose fiscal data are based on a
calendar year (i.e., January to December), this series will be the same as their GDP in
current prices (WEO13).
GDP growth (Growth, %): author’s own calculation applying the formula GDPt GDPt 1GDPt
to the GDP series corresponding to fiscal year (current prices).
GDP per capita, constant prices (GDPpc, units of national currency): GDP is ex-
pressed in constant national currency per person. Data are derived by dividing constant
price GDP by total population (WEO13).
L First stage IV regressions
Table 10: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Corrt 1
Newst 1 0.00222*** 0.00213*** 0.00214*** 0.00222***
(0.000268) (0.000285) (0.000290) (0.000267)
MCOt 1 -0.000394* -0.000365 -0.000480* -0.000383
(0.000237) (0.000249) (0.000258) (0.000237)
N 611 541 513 611
R-square 0.539 0.567 0.547 0.540
F 11.35 12.01 11.39 11.37
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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M Robustness check for contagion
Table 11: OLS with robust standard errors
Net lending Primary surplus CAPB Expenditure
Yield Shockst 1 0.459*** 0.468*** 0.249** -0.265**
(0.157) (0.166) (0.122) (0.128)
Net lendingt 1 0.724***
(0.0426)
Primary surplust 1 0.753***
(0.0410)
CAPBt 1 0.720***
(0.0554)
Expendituret 1 0.770***
(0.0344)
Debtt 1 0.0198 0.0510*** 0.00951 0.00266
(0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0107) (0.0123)
Debt2t 1 -0.000161*** -0.000249*** -0.0000845* 0.0000686
(0.0000470) (0.0000498) (0.0000488) (0.0000477)
Log GDPt 1 -1.784** -2.430*** -2.424** 1.177
(0.816) (0.812) (1.150) (0.794)
Log GDPpct 1 1.881 4.002** 2.876 0.858
(1.635) (1.894) (2.042) (1.585)
Growtht 1 5.182 2.142 8.253 -5.805
(3.936) (4.450) (6.371) (3.930)
Ratingt 1 -0.116** -0.0976* -0.0594 0.0781*
(0.0473) (0.0550) (0.0479) (0.0431)
Log yieldst 1 0.00670 0.617 0.827 0.441
(0.455) (0.535) (0.583) (0.407)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 748 658 598 748
R-square 0.849 0.845 0.846 0.979
F 41.58 43.36 . 661.5
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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N Regression by country groups
Table 12: OLS with robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E↵ect of a 1 unit change in Corrt in: OECD EU PERIPHERALS EM
Net lending/borrowing -0.0284*** -0.0350*** -0.0770** -0.0249
(0.00885) (0.0112) (0.0333) (0.0233)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.823 0.765 0.741 0.761
F 45.38 33.02 14.59 45.21
Primary balance -0.0258*** -0.0315*** -0.0722** -0.0272
(0.00863) (0.0107) (0.0319) (0.0222)
N 534 396 92 96
R-square 0.752 0.712 0.733 0.731
F 39.80 32.87 13.86 44.28
Potential structural balance -0.0107* -0.0105 -0.0574** -0.0220
(0.00645) (0.00856) (0.0243) (0.0182)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.848 0.852 0.857 0.853
F 59.24 43.61 22.59 70.95
Government spending 0.0246*** 0.0278** 0.0425 0.0246
(0.00906) (0.0122) (0.0282) (0.0310)
N 535 397 93 96
R-square 0.942 0.928 0.840 0.975
F 399.3 249.0 62.09 302.8
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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O Introduction of a common debt limit
In this section I analyze the e↵ect of setting an exogenous common debt limit. This policy
only has an e↵ect when the debt ceiling D¯2 is lower than type B’s full information allocation
DFI2 , as in figure 7. Suppose the equilibrium is the separating one e
⇤. Once the debt ceiling
is introduced, type B is not allowed to choose its optimal debt level because it would violate
the fiscal rule. In a separating equilibrium under the new debt ceiling rule, type B chooses
the highest amount of debt possible, D¯2, as depicted in figure 8. But this gives type B a
lower utility, thereby forcing type A to choose an even lower amount of debt than D B2 .
Type A needs to implement more austerity in order to avoid imitation from B because the
outside option for B has become worse. Both types are worse o↵, even though the riskiness
of debt improves because the sovereigns have a lower default probability.
Nevertheless, the introduction of a debt limit might let the separating equilibrium be
defeated. For instance, the pooling equilibrium at D¯2 in figure 9 makes both types better
o↵, thus defeating the separating equilibrium. Compared with the initial equilibrium e⇤ in
figure 7, however, every country type loses. This can be seen by comparing the utility levels
of type A and B with the equilibrium allocations from figure 7 represented by the dotted
lines. Moreover, type B’s default premium decreases but A’s increases, as the arrows on
the vertical axis show, thus the overall probability of default may increase or decrease. All
countries can be made worse o↵ by the introduction of a debt ceiling, which also fails to
improve the riskiness of debt.
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Figure 7: A common debt ceiling at D¯2.
Figure 8: Separating equilibrium with a
common debt ceiling.
Figure 9: Pooling equilibrium with a common
debt ceiling.
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